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1  | INTRODUC TION
Natural resources are strongly connected to the onset, duration and 
recurrence of armed conflicts.1 The contribution of the illicit trade in 
natural resources to the financing of armed conflicts, including the on‐
going conflicts in the Democratic Republic (DR) of the Congo and the 
Central African Republic, has been well documented.2 Likewise, con‐
1 See,	e.g.,	K	Ballentine	and	H	Nitzschke	(eds),	Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource 
Dimensions of Civil War	(Lynne	Rienner	2005);	and	C	Bruch,	C	Muffett	and	SS	Nichols,	
‘Natural	Resources	and	Post‐conflict	Governance:	Building	a	Sustainable	Peace’	in	C	
Bruch,	C	Muffett	and	SS	Nichols	(eds),	Governance, Natural Resources, and Post‐conflict 
Peacebuilding (Earthscan 2016) 1.
2 The	armed	conflict	in	the	DR	Congo	has	been	financed	notably	through	the	illicit	
exploitation and smuggling of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, while diamonds and gold 
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Email: d.a.dam@law.leidenuniv.nl Natural resources are strongly connected to the onset, duration and recurrence of 
armed	conflicts.	However,	even	after	an	armed	conflict	has	formally	ended,	natural	re‐
sources can be an important trigger for a relapse into armed conflict. For these reasons, 
it is of the utmost importance, both from a security and a development perspective, 
to address natural resources as an integral part of the peace process. This article aims 
to assess how provisions in peace agreements addressing natural resource governance 
are embedded in the international legal framework. It inquires into the particularities 
and legal nature of peace agreements and examines the various functions of natural re‐
source arrangements as part of peace agreements. Finally, as each category of natural 
resources comes with distinct legal questions and peacebuilding challenges, the article 
zooms	in	on	water	governance	as	a	case	study	to	explore	the	different	ways	in	which	
natural resource arrangements in peace agreements and international law interact. The 
analysis	is	based	on	a	study	of	40	intra‐State	agreements,	 including	the	2015	South	
Sudan	agreement,	the	2015	Mali	agreement	and	the	2016	Colombian	agreement.
flicts over land use and ownership have played an important role in the 
armed	conflicts	in	Guatemala,	Colombia	and	Sudan,	amongst	others.3 
Recent reports furthermore point to water shortages, exacerbated by 
climate change and population growth, as one of the most acute risks 
for the outbreak of future armed conflicts.4	However,	even	after	an	
armed conflict has formally ended, natural resources can be an import‐
ant	trigger	for	a	relapse	into	armed	conflict.	Sometimes	this	is	because	
access to natural resources for armed groups as a source of conflict 
funding has not been properly cut off. In other situations, disputes be‐
tween local communities and the government or between such com‐
munities over the allocation of natural resources or the distribution of 
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water	is	jeopardized,	as	this	commodity	is	essential	for	satisfying	the	
most basic needs of human beings, including drinking water, sanitation 
and food production. For these reasons, it is of the utmost importance, 
both from a security and a development perspective, to address natu‐
ral resources as an integral part of the peace process. This need to ad‐
dress natural resource governance is reflected in recent peace 
agreements, which increasingly include natural resource provisions. In 
their 2015 joint report, the United Nations (UN) Department of 
Political Affairs and the United Nations Environment Programme sig‐
nalled that ‘all major agreements from 2005 to 2014 contained such 
provisions’,	 compared	 to	only	half	of	 the	agreements	 concluded	be‐
tween 1989 and 2004.6
This article aims to assess how natural resource provisions in peace 
agreements are embedded in the international legal framework, with a 
specific emphasis on water resources. Of course, the management of 
natural	 resources	situated	within	a	State’s	 territory	 is	subject	 to	that	
State’s	sovereignty.	However,	this	sovereignty	is	increasingly	qualified	
by	international	legal	obligations	entered	into	by	States,	either	through	
their participation in treaty regimes or by way of customary interna‐
tional law.7 Natural resource arrangements in peace agreements are 
therefore increasingly governed by international law. This is all the 
more true for water resources, as these often fall within the jurisdiction 
of	more	than	one	State,	requiring	cooperation	or,	as	a	minimum,	taking	
into	account	the	interests	of	these	other	States.	As	a	consequence,	in‐
ternational law plays an important role in their management. Conversely, 
natural resource arrangements have the potential to contribute to 
shaping the international legal framework for the governance of natural 
resources as part of post‐conflict peacebuilding, for example by reinter‐
preting existing international legal norms for the purpose of addressing 
the specific needs and challenges of post‐conflict societies.
The article assesses these forms of interaction between interna‐
tional law and peace agreements for the purpose of clarifying the over‐
all international legal framework that applies to natural resource 
governance	in	post‐conflict	situations.	The	term	‘governance’	is	under‐
stood to denote the broader framework for the exercise of political 
authority – either on the global, regional, domestic or local level – with 
respect	to	the	management	of	natural	 resources	within	States.8 The 
focus of the analysis is on peace agreements that have been concluded 
to end internal armed conflicts. The reasons for confining the analysis 
to this type of agreement are twofold. First, internal armed conflicts 
are the most prevalent type of armed conflict today. Resolving these 
armed conflicts does not only pose specific challenges to the domestic 
order	of	States,	but	also	raises	distinct	questions	about	the	role	of	the	
international community, in light of the principles of non‐intervention 
and	sovereign	equality	enshrined	in	the	UN	Charter.	Second,	the	legal	
nature of peace agreements that end internal armed conflicts is subject 
to a long‐standing doctrinal debate.9 This makes it all the more relevant 
to assess how this type of agreement interacts with international law.
For this purpose, the article first inquires into the particulari‐
ties and legal nature of peace agreements to determine the frame‐
work	 for	 interaction	 with	 the	 international	 legal	 order	 (Section	 2).	
Subsequently,	 it	examines	the	various	functions	of	natural	resource	
arrangements as part of peace agreements for the purpose of iden‐
tifying	relevant	international	legal	norms	(Section	3).	Lastly,	the	arti‐
cle	zooms	in	on	water	governance	and	explores	the	different	ways	in	
which water arrangements in selected peace agreements, including 
the	2015	agreements	on	Mali	and	South	Sudan	and	the	2016	agree‐
ment	on	Colombia,	interact	with	international	law	(Section	4).
2  | CONCEPTUALIZING INTR A‐STATE 
PE ACE AGREEMENTS
This section discusses the particularities of peace agreements, ex‐
plores their legal status and examines their relationship with interna‐
tional law. The purpose of this section is to clarify the phenomenon 
of peace agreements as well as the framework for their interaction 
with the international legal order. In line with the general objectives 
of	 this	 article,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 discussion	 is	 on	 intra‐State	 peace	
agreements.
2.1 | The particularities of intra‐State 
peace agreements
Peace agreements can be defined as agreements concluded between 
parties to an armed conflict for the purpose of ending the armed con‐
flict. Of course, this basic definition does not do justice to the great va‐
riety of peace agreements, both in terms of form and substance. From a 
substantive perspective, the scope of the agreement may range from 
merely establishing the conditions for a ceasefire between the parties 
to	the	conflict	to	creating	the	framework	for	a	new	State	order.	In	their	
most developed form, peace agreements do not only regulate the con‐
ditions for ending the armed violence; they recreate the very fabric of 
the	 political,	 social	 and	 economic	 structures	 of	 the	 State.10 These 
framework agreements can best be described as interim constitu‐
tions.11 In some instances, these agreements even temporarily displace 
the	 State’s	 constitution	 pending	 legislative	 proposals	 for	 permanent	
constitutional	amendments.	However,	it	should	be	kept	in	mind	that,	in	
many instances, peace agreements are developed over time as part of a 
broader	 peace	 process.	 Many	 peace	 agreements	 are	 ‘partial’,	 in	 the	
6 UN	DPA	and	UNEP	(n	3)	46.
7 See	NJ	Schrijver,	Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties 
(Cambridge	University	Press	1997);	and	DA	Dam‐de	Jong,	International Law and 





Daws (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford University Press 2008) 
620;	E	Brown‐Weiss	and	A	Sornarajah,	‘Good	Governance’	in	R	Wolfrum	(ed),	
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. IV (Oxford University Press 2012) 516; and 
KH	Ladeur,	‘Governance,	Theory	Of’	in	R.	Wolfrum,	ibid	541.
9 See,	e.g.,	C	Bell,	On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (Oxford 
University	Press	2008);	see	also	Section	2.2.
10 For	a	more	detailed	assessment	of	the	purposes	of	peace	agreements,	see	P	
Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution	(3rd	edn,	Sage	2012).
11 See	J	Sapiano,	‘Courting	Peace:	Judicial	Review	and	Peace	Jurisprudence’	(2017)	6	
Global Constitutionalism 131, 135–136.
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sense that they address distinct issues that are negotiated separately 
between the parties as part of a series of sequenced negotiations.12 
Ideally, these agreements build towards a final agreement, but this is not 
necessarily so. The broader setting of the peace process in which the 
particular agreement has been negotiated should therefore always be 
taken into account when analysing its arrangements.
Furthermore, to fully appreciate the arrangements set out in the 
agreements for the post‐conflict governance of natural resources, it is 
important to keep in mind two other particularities of peace agree‐
ments. First, the issues that are addressed within a peace agreement 
are very context‐specific and also depend to a great extent on the par‐
ties negotiating the agreement. It is not necessarily so that all the par‐
ties to the conflict are represented at the negotiation table. A persistent 
problem is, for example, the underrepresentation of women in the ne‐
gotiation of peace agreements.13 In other instances there may be good 
reasons to exclude parties from the peace process, for example be‐
cause the beliefs or methods of these parties are incompatible with 
core values shared by the international community.14	 However,	 it	 is	
clear that these decisions impact upon the terms and modalities of the 
negotiated settlement. For this reason, it is essential to appraise for 
each single agreement which of the parties to the armed conflict were 
represented and, more importantly, what were their stakes at the nego‐
tiation	table	and	their	political	sensitivities.	Second,	to	understand	the	
framework in which a peace agreement operates, it should be noted 
that, once an agreement has been reached, it is not always imple‐
mented. Peace agreements are often fragile, especially when it con‐
cerns	 internal	 armed	 conflicts.	More	 precisely,	more	 than	 a	 third	 of	
these agreements break down within five years.15 Implementation of 
the arrangements in peace agreements therefore is often faulty. This 
however does not necessarily undermine their normative value, since 
the arrangements do represent the solution that has been agreed upon 
by the parties to the agreement. As such, they represent benchmarks 
for the parties to fall back on.16 This is why this article focuses primarily 
on the arrangements themselves, notwithstanding their implementa‐
tion record.
2.2 | The legal nature of intra‐State 
peace agreements
In legal terms, a primary distinction can be made between peace agree‐
ments	 concluded	 between	 States	 and	 peace	 agreements	 concluded	
between	States	and	armed	groups.	The	former	could	be	classified	as	
‘treaties’	within	the	meaning	of	Article	2	of	the	1969	Vienna	Convention	
on	 the	 Law	 of	 Treaties,	which	 defines	 a	 ‘treaty’	 as	 ‘an	 international	
agreement	concluded	between	States	in	written	form	and	governed	by	
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more	 related	 instruments	 and	whatever	 its	 particular	 designation’.17 
Therefore, as long as the agreement satisfies these conditions, it is gov‐
erned by the rules on inter alia the conclusion, interpretation, suspen‐
sion	and	termination	of	treaties	as	set	out	in	the	Vienna	Convention,	no	
matter its form or whether it is a single agreement or rather a package 
of	agreements.	However,	it	rarely	happens	that	an	internal	armed	con‐
flict	is	terminated	by	a	peace	agreement	between	States.	One	of	the	





ation	 is	 different	 for	 agreements	 concluded	 between	 States	 and	
armed	groups.	Article	3	of	the	1969	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	
Treaties indicates that ‘[t]he fact that the present Convention does 
not	apply	to	international	agreements	concluded	between	States	and	
other subjects of international law or between such other subjects of 
international law … shall not affect the legal force of such agree‐
ments’.19	However,	this	provision	does	not	clarify	who	can	be	consid‐
ered	as	‘subjects	of	international	law’.	The	commentary	to	the	Draft	
Articles adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on the 
topic clearly indicates that the restrictive interpretation of the term 
‘treaty’	was	not	‘in	any	way	intended	to	deny	that	other	subjects	of	
international	 law,	 such	 as	 international	 organizations	 and	 insurgent 










still marginal. For current data, see <http://www.unwom en.org/en/what‐we‐do/
peace‐and‐secur ity/facts‐and‐figures> and <https ://www.cfr.org/inter activ e/
womens‐parti cipat ion‐in‐peace‐proce sses/explo re‐the‐data>. Important work is carried 
out inter alia by UNEP, UN Women, the UN Development Programme and the 
Peacebuilding	Support	Office’s	(PBSO)	Joint	Programme	on	Women,	Natural	Resources	
and	Peace,	which	recently	established	a	Knowledge	Platform	on	Gender,	Natural	







Res/2254 (18 December 2015) para 8.
15 An	empirical	study	based	on	the	Uppsala	Conflict	Data	Program	Peace	Agreement	
Dataset	showed	that	77	of	the	216	agreements	concluded	between	1975	and	2011	were	
never implemented. Interestingly, this does not necessarily imply that violence recurs. 
The study concludes that ‘in 19 of these cases violence with the same parties did not 
restart	even	though	the	agreement	was	not	implemented’.	See	S	Högbladh,	‘Peace	
Agreements	1975–2011	–	Updating	the	UCDP	Peace	Agreement	Dataset’	in	T	
Pettersson and L Themnér (eds), States in Armed Conflict 2011 (Uppsala University, 
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from	the	ILC	reports	that	the	term	‘insurgent	communities’	refers	only	
to opposition groups ‘to which a measure of recognition has been ac‐
corded’.21	These	would	include	recognized	self‐determination	move‐
ments	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 1(3)	 of	 the	 1977	 Additional	
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, such as Polisario in the 
Western	Sahara.	However,	whether	other	opposition	groups	would	
qualify as subjects of international law having a treaty‐making capac‐







for this reason the CPA would qualify as a treaty. Nevertheless, the 
arbitral tribunal which was called upon by the parties to the agree‐
ment to settle a dispute regarding its implementation concluded that 
the CPA was not a treaty. It qualified the CPA instead as an ‘agreement 
… between the government of a sovereign state, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, a political party/movement, albeit one which th[is] 
agreement	…	recognize[s]	may	–	or	may	not	–	govern	over	a	sovereign	
state	in	the	near	future’.23 Given the controversies regarding the cir‐
cumstances in which armed opposition groups are considered to 
enjoy a sufficient measure of recognition to be deemed capable to 
conclude treaties, it may be argued that the implementation of the 
majority	of	peace	agreements	concluded	between	States	and	armed	
groups is primarily governed by domestic law.
The principal difference between the two types of peace agree‐
ments is therefore that peace agreements concluded between 
States	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 international	 legal	 order,	 while	
peace	 agreements	 concluded	 between	 States	 and	 armed	 groups	
are primarily part of the domestic legal order. This difference has 
implications for the way in which these agreements interact with 
international	 law:	 this	 interaction	 is	 primarily	 horizontal	 for	 inter‐
State	peace	agreements	and	primarily	vertical	for	intra‐State	peace	
agreements.
2.3 | Relationship with the international legal order
Considering	 intra‐State	peace	 agreements	 as	part of domestic law 
does not imply that they are necessarily subjected to international 
law. To the contrary, in recent years, international courts and tribu‐
nals have accepted that peace agreements – because of their spe‐
cific nature and the interests at stake – may sometimes even 
temporarily override relevant norms of international law. A specific 




of	 Bosnia	 and	 Herzegovina.24 This power‐sharing agreement was 
challenged	before	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	by	citizens	
of Jewish and Roma origin. While the Court questioned both the 
continued rationale for and proportionality of the discriminatory 
treatment	in	light	of	the	changed	circumstances,	it	did	recognize	as	a	




international norms, for example with respect to human rights pro‐
tection and good governance. It is exactly this interplay between 
peace agreements and international law that is central to this article 
and	which	 is	 further	explored	 in	Section	4	with	respect	 to	natural	
resource	 governance.	 More	 generally,	 references	 to	 international	
legal norms in a peace agreement may serve several interrelated ob‐
jectives. First, such references may be specifically intended to inter‐
nationalize	 the	 agreement,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 its	 implementation	
becomes subject to an international institutional machinery. 
References to specific human rights in an agreement, for example, 
may trigger the engagement of human rights treaty monitoring bod‐
ies with respect to the interpretation and implementation of the 
agreement’s	provisions.26	Second	and	related	to	this,	references	to	
international legal norms may provide a universal framework for in‐
terpreting the commitments set out in the peace agreement. In this 
sense, international law functions both as a normative framework 
and as a shared discourse for the parties to the agreement, providing 




22 See,	e.g.,	Bell	(n	12)	380–381;	C	Wittke,	Law in the Twilight: International Courts and 
Tribunals, the Security Council and the Internationalization of Peace Agreements between 
State and Non‐State Parties (Cambridge University Press 2018).







25 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina	App	Nos	27996/06	and	34836/06	(ECtHR,	
Grand Chamber Judgment, 22 December 2009) para 45. For a more elaborate analysis of 
this	judgment	and	other	relevant	judgments,	see	Sapiano	(n	11).
26 These	bodies	would	then	be	able	to	assess	a	State’s	performance,	both	pursuant	to	
periodic reporting procedures and through an individual complaint mechanism. An 
example includes the 2003 Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, 
Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(CESCR)	with	respect	to	Guatemala,	in	which	the	Committee	
indicated	its	concern	regarding	adverse	impacts	‘on	the	full	realization	of	economic,	








Environmental Protection and Transitions from Conflict to Peace: Clarifying Norms, Principles, 
and Practices	(Oxford	University	Press	2017)	119,	129;	and,	more	generally,	C	Bell,	Peace 
Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2000).
27 See	S	Akram	et	al,	International Law and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: A Rights‐based 
Approach to Peace in the Middle‐East	(Routledge	2011)	4;	and	P	Kastner,	Legal Normativity 
in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2015) 33–36.
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Logically, the use of international legal notions in a peace agree‐
ment may also have a catalysing effect on norm creation related to 
peace	processes.	This	is	the	type	of	interaction	Christine	Bell	refers	
to when she employs the notion of lex pacificatoria, that is, ‘the law 
of	 the	 peacemakers’.28 In her work, she has convincingly demon‐
strated how peace settlement practice has developed innovative 
concepts which have had an impact on the interpretation of, inter 
alia, the right to self‐determination and international refugee law.29 
Section	4	below	addresses	this	type	of	normative	 interaction	with	
respect to natural resource governance.
Furthermore,	 intra‐State	peace	 agreements	 result	 on	 a	 regular	
basis of international efforts of mediation and consultation, while 
often international monitoring and review are part and parcel of 
these agreements. These forms of international involvement in the 
negotiation	 and	 implementation	 of	 intra‐State	 peace	 agreements	
have two notable effects. First, the agreement itself becomes inter‐
nationalized	due	 to	 the	 involvement	of	 international	organizations	
and	third	States.	The	role	of	these	actors	can	be	confined	to	political	
support for the peace agreement, through notions such as ‘wit‐
nesses’	 or	 ‘guarantors’	 to	 the	 agreement,	 but	 it	 can	 also	 take	 the	
form of direct international involvement in the monitoring of the 
agreement. Examples of the latter include the deployment of a veri‐
fication or peacekeeping mission to actively support implementation 
of the agreement.30 In many instances, arrangements for the deploy‐
ment of these missions are part and parcel of the peace agreement 
and	only	need	subsequent	authorization	by	the	respective	interna‐
tional	organization.31 Another effect of the involvement of interna‐
tional actors can be seen in the substance of the agreement. 
International actors bring with them their own sets of norms, which 
are based on international legal norms and principles.32 For example, 
the official policy of the UN precludes it from co‐signing an agree‐
ment which includes full amnesties for the commission of interna‐
tional crimes.33 UN involvement in the negotiation of a peace 
agreement may therefore, inter alia, impact upon the transitional 
justice arrangements of the agreement.
In sum, this article posits that the interaction between peace 
agreements and international law goes two ways. First, interna‐
tional law provides a normative and interpretative framework for 
the design and implementation of the arrangements set out in peace 
agreements.	Second,	peace	agreements	can	also	shape	and	further	
develop international law, most notably by providing novel inter‐
pretations to existing norms and principles in international law. This 
interplay	 is	 further	 explored	 in	 Section	 4,	 focusing	 specifically	 on	
water governance.
3  | POSITIONING NATUR AL RESOURCE 
ARR ANGEMENTS WITHIN PE ACE 
AGREEMENTS
While	 the	 previous	 section	 addressed	 intra‐State	 peace	 agree‐
ments in a more general fashion, the current section focuses on 
the position of natural resource arrangements within these agree‐
ments. As indicated in the introduction, all major peace agree‐
ments concluded in recent years include provisions on natural 
resources.	More	specifically,	one	can	discern	three	categories	of	
natural resources addressed in these agreements, namely renew‐
able natural resources, such as water, fisheries, wildlife and for‐
ests; non‐renewable or extractive natural resources, such as oil, 
gas and minerals; and land.34 The purpose of this section is to 




to natural resource arrangements.
3.1 | The relationship between natural 
resources and the conflict dynamics
The way in which natural resources are addressed in peace agree‐
ments depends on several factors, which are closely related to the 
dynamics of the armed conflict for which a settlement is negotiated. 
These factors are related to the nature of the underlying armed con‐
flict, the role that natural resources played within this conflict and 
the type of natural resources involved. These factors are discussed 
in turn.
Every armed conflict has its own dynamics, which frames the 
resulting peace process. Nevertheless, on a more abstract level, 
one can distinguish between various categories of armed conflict, 
which partly determine how questions relating to natural resource 
governance	could	be	addressed.	Addressing	intra‐State	armed	con‐
flicts exclusively, a distinction should be made between armed con‐
flicts in which opposition movements contest the authority of the 
28 See	Bell	(n	9);	and	C	Bell,	‘Peace	Settlements	and	International	Law:	From	Lex 
Pacificatoria to Jus post Bellum’	in	N	White	and	C	Henderson	(eds),	Research Handbook on 
International Conflict and Security Law: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum 
(Edward Elgar 2013) 499.
29 See	Bell	(n	9).
30 Examples	of	these	types	of	missions	include	the	United	Nations	Verification	Mission	in	
Guatemala, deployed by the UN between 1994 and 2004 to monitor the peace process 
in	Guatemala;	and	the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Sierra	Leone,	deployed	by	the	UN	
between 1999 and 2005 to cooperate with the government and the other parties in 
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government, secessionist armed conflicts and conflicts involving 
indigenous peoples. To the extent that natural resources play a role 
in the underlying dynamics of these armed conflicts, each type of 
armed conflict requires different solutions.
The resolution of classical power struggles involving natural re‐
sources calls for the inclusion of arrangements that restore governance 
of natural resources to the central government and focus on incorpo‐
rating safeguards to promote equitable access to natural resources and 
their benefits. The 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement, for example, 
contains	detailed	arrangements	for	‘democratizing	land	access’,	includ‐
ing the creation of a permanent land bank ‘as a vehicle for free distribu‐
tion’.35 This land bank is created ‘for the benefit of campesino 
communities and especially rural women with insufficient or no land 
and the rural communities most affected by poverty, neglect and the 
conflict;	legalizing	property	ownership	rights;	and,	as	a	result,	reversing	
concentration	and	promoting	a	fair	distribution	of	land’.36
The resolution of secessionist armed conflicts on the other hand 
calls for arrangements which redistribute power among the former 
belligerents.	The	2005	Agreement	between	Sudan	and	South	Sudan	
provides a relevant example. This agreement provided for a transi‐
tional	period	in	which	South	Sudan	obtained	substantial	autonomy	
within	the	existing	boundaries	of	the	State	of	Sudan	until	a	referen‐
dum	was	 held.	 This	 referendum	would	 allow	 the	 people	 of	 South	
Sudan	to	choose	between	remaining	an	autonomous	region	within	
the	State	of	Sudan	or	the	creation	of	a	new	State	of	South	Sudan.	As	
part of this transitional arrangement, the agreement provided for a 
concurrent	competence	for	the	government	of	Sudan	and	the	newly	
established	(local)	government	of	South	Sudan	as	regards	land	ten‐
ure and the sharing of the proceeds of oil production between 
them.37 This kind of power‐sharing mechanism is fairly common in 
peace agreements that end secessionist armed conflicts.
Lastly, armed conflicts involving indigenous peoples call for special 
arrangements	which	protect	indigenous	peoples’	rights	over	land	and	
natural	resources,	as	recognized	by	international	law.	Several	human	
rights	bodies	have	 recognized	 the	special	 relationship	of	 indigenous	
peoples with their traditional lands and natural resources as part of 
their rights to self‐determination and to enjoy their culture.38 The in‐
clusion of arrangements regulating ownership and/or access for indig‐
enous peoples to their lands and natural resources are therefore 
essential. This may also implicate respecting practices that may other‐
wise	be	illegal.	Here	again,	the	2016	Colombian	peace	agreement	pro‐
vides a conspicuous example, where an exception to a domestic policy 
to ban illicit coca production is made for indigenous peoples. The 




of how natural resources are addressed in peace agreements, also the 
role that natural resources have played in the conflict assumes an im‐
portant role. Natural resources are rarely among the root causes of 
armed conflicts, but they have been associated to their outbreak.40 
The grievances theory focuses on perceived injustices relating to the 
use of natural resources as a cause for the outbreak of armed conflict. 
These perceived injustices may relate to the effects of the exploitation 
of natural resources on the living environment of particular ethnic or 
social groups or they may relate to the (unequal) distribution of the 
benefits obtained from the exploitation of natural resources.41 The 
greed theory on the other hand focuses on the prospects for armed 
groups to gain access to large deposits of natural resources as an incen‐
tive to start an armed conflict.42 Related to greed as a factor in the 
onset of armed conflicts is the role that natural resources rents can 
play in perpetuating the armed conflict. Natural resources give parties 
to an armed conflict access to weapons and to political support. In ad‐
dition, the profits obtained from resource exploitation can prove to be 
a disincentive for armed groups to sit down at the negotiating table.43
Obviously, addressing grievances over natural resources requires 
a radically different approach than addressing their contribution to 
conflict financing. To address grievances, peace agreements would 
have to include arrangements that regulate the allocation of natural 
resources	among	marginalized	communities	and	enhance	their	par‐
ticipation in decision making. Where natural resources played a role 
in financing armed groups, peace agreements would more likely in‐
clude	arrangements	aimed	at	incentivizing	armed	groups	to	partici‐
pate	in	the	peace	process	(e.g.	through	disarmament,	demobilization	
and reintegration (DDR) programmes or power‐sharing arrange‐

















case law and legal provisions.
39 Final	Agreement	for	Ending	the	Conflict	and	Building	a	Stable	and	Lasting	Peace	(n	31)	
Section	4.
40 See,	e.g.,	P	Le	Billon,	Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 14.





43 See,	e.g.,	I	Bannon	and	P	Collier	(eds),	Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options 
and Actions	(World	Bank	2003)	217–218.
44 Power‐sharing	refers	to	‘the	reconstitution	of	“normal”	politics	in	a	postconflict	society	
through new institutional arrangements including different degrees of autonomy and 
federalism, or governance arrangements. Power‐sharing shapes incentives of belligerents 




     |  7DAM‐De JONG
financing for armed groups undermining the peace process (through 
institution building).
Of course, even if natural resources did not play a role in the conflict, 
it may still be important to include specific provisions in the agreement. 
This is especially so when natural resources are damaged as a result of 
the hostilities. Collateral damage to the environment is a common fea‐
ture of armed conflicts. Arrangements with respect to restoring the de‐
graded environment are regularly included in peace agreements.45
A last factor impacting the way natural resources are addressed 
in peace agreements stems from the type of natural resource in‐
volved.	As	Jensen	and	Kron	indicate:
Different types of natural resources such as minerals, oil 
and gas, timber, land and water can generate unique 
kinds of conflict between stakeholders, often at different 
spatial and political scales.… Typically, the potential for a 
natural resource to generate risks and vulnerabilities that 
drive conflict depends on the magnitude and distribution 
of revenues and benefits they generate, the number of 
livelihoods they directly support or the scale of negative 
impacts they cause.46
Indeed, scarce natural resources such as water have a very dif‐
ferent role in the conflict dynamics than valuable export commodi‐
ties such as diamonds.47 In addition, these natural resources also 
have different functions in peacebuilding. Diamonds for example, 
can perform an important function in kick‐starting the economy and 
ensuring peace‐dividends. Water on the other hand, is essential to 
support livelihoods.
3.2 | Categorization of natural resource 
arrangements in peace agreements
As a result of the factors examined in the previous section, natural 
resource	arrangements	 in	peace	agreements	can	be	categorized	 in	
the following ways. First, natural resources are often addressed from 
a developmental or humanitarian perspective. Relevant provisions 
relate to the task of the government to provide basic services to the 
population or concern arrangements regarding access for communi‐
ties to natural resources. A human rights‐based approach is particu‐
larly	apt	for	the	implementation	of	this	type	of	provisions.	Second,	
natural resource arrangements often call for environmental protec‐
tion measures. These arrangements relate to the restoration and/or 
conservation of (degraded) natural resources. International environ‐
mental law as well as human rights law are relevant for the imple‐
mentation of these arrangements. Third, natural resources can be 
addressed from a security perspective. Relevant arrangements 
approach natural resources as tools to build confidence between 
former belligerents. These arrangements are often connected to 
DDR programmes and include projects aimed at restoring vital infra‐
structure, such as water systems, as a means to reintegrate former 
combatants. As such, international law on peace and security and, 
more specifically, peacekeeping operations may play an important 
role in their implementation. Finally, also relating to security, one can 
discern arrangements that establish structures for the governance 
of natural resources and their revenues. These include power‐shar‐
ing, wealth‐sharing and/or autonomy arrangements. These types of 
arrangements are primarily addressed through the constitutional 
order	of	the	respective	State.	However,	international	law	does	play	a	
role in their implementation. Where it concerns autonomy arrange‐
ments, international legal norms relating to the right to self‐determi‐
nation, such as the requirement that any choice for a particular 
political and economic system has to be based on ‘a free and genuine 
expression	of	the	will	of	the	peoples	concerned’,48 provide the pa‐
rameters for the design and implementation of these arrangements. 
Likewise, power‐sharing arrangements need to respect obligations 
arising from the right to self‐determination, including most impor‐
tantly that natural resources exploitation must benefit the people of 
the	State.49
From	 this	 categorization50 it is clear that natural resource ar‐
rangements in peace agreements interact with several branches of 
international law, including international human rights law, interna‐
tional environmental law and international law relating to the main‐
tenance of international peace and security. These connections are 
further explored in the following section, which aims to situate 
peace agreements within the international regulatory environment 
for	the	management	of	natural	resources	within	States.
4  | INTERPL AY BET WEEN PE ACE 
AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL L AW
The natural resource arrangements in peace agreements do not op‐
erate in a legal vacuum. On the contrary, these arrangements are 
part of a broader international regulatory framework which delin‐
eates the governance of natural resources at the domestic level. 
In	addition,	as	set	out	 in	Section	2,	peace	agreements	themselves	
often contain and build upon international norms. This section ex‐
plores	these	forms	of	interplay	in	more	detail.	Section	4.1	sets	out	
the general framework for interplay between natural resource ar‐
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International Intervention: Combating Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources through 
Peace	Processes’	in	M	Weller	et	al	(eds),	International Law and Peace Settlements (2020, 
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4.2 subsequently explores how these forms of interplay take shape 
in selected peace agreements. The focus of this section is on water 
governance, in line with the general theme of this special issue.
4.1 | The international legal framework for the 
governance of natural resources within States
The governance of natural resources is primarily regulated by the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This prin‐
ciple has been set out in several UN General Assembly resolutions 
and treaties and is considered to be part of customary international 
law.51	 It	provides	States	considerable	 freedom	to	 freely	dispose	of	
their natural resources, as long as they respect the limitations that 
international law has set for the purpose of inter alia protecting 
human rights, the environment and foreign investors.52	 Some	 of	
these limitations ensue directly from the principle itself. The 1962 
Declaration	 on	 Permanent	 Sovereignty	 over	 Natural	 Resources,	
which is the key document formulating the principle, includes an ob‐
ligation	for	States	to	exploit	natural	resources	for	national	develop‐
ment and the well‐being of the people.53
Other limitations can be derived from the broader international 
legal framework. Article 1(2) of the International Covenant on 
Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	 (ICESCR)	 and	 the	 International	
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), incorporating the right 
of peoples to economic self‐determination, for example, provides that 
‘in	no	case	may	a	people	be	deprived	of	its	own	means	of	subsistence’.54 
Arguably,	this	right	contains	both	a	horizontal	(inter‐State)	as	well	as	a	
vertical (people versus government) dimension.55 The rights of foreign 
investors	also	impose	clear	limitations	on	the	right	of	States	to	freely	
dispose of their natural resources by way of standards such as ‘fair and 
equitable	treatment’	as	well	as	the	conditions	attached	to	expropria‐
tion of property.56 Furthermore, multilateral environmental agree‐
ments	formulate	obligations	for	States	with	respect	to	conservation	of	
natural	resources,	including	their	sustainable	use.	Some	of	these	envi‐
ronmental	 conventions	 formulate	 general	 constraints	 for	 States	 re‐
garding the sustainable use of their natural resources, based either on 
the precautionary principle or on the customary law obligation to pre‐
vent significant transboundary environmental harm.57 Other conven‐
tions promote nature conservation, inter alia, through the establishment 
and protection of designated sites. These conventions, notably the 
1971	 Ramsar	 Convention	 on	Wetlands	 of	 International	 Importance,	
the	 1972	World	Heritage	Convention	 and	 the	 1992	Convention	 on	
Biological	Diversity,58 are particularly relevant for peacebuilding, since 
their institutional machinery may offer valuable assistance to post‐
conflict	States	to	restore	their	environment.59
These regimes apply to natural resources that are found within a 
State’s	territory	and	under	its	national	economic	jurisdiction	in	mar‐
itime waters, but also to natural resources shared between two or 
more	States.	Moreover,	 specifically	 relevant	 for	 the	protection	of	
water resources, the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE 
Convention) contains rules relating to the protection of the aquatic 
environment, including the principles of prevention, precaution and 
the polluter‐pays principle.60	 Some	 of	 these	 rules	 have	 also	 been	
included	 in	 the	 1997	Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 the	Navigational	
Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention). 
This Convention moreover contains rules for the allocation of water 
resources, based on the principles of equitable use and participa‐
tion.	Many	of	 its	 rules	 codify	 or	 build	 on	 customary	 international	
legal norms.61	However,	notwithstanding	the	entry	into	force	of	the	
UN Watercourses Convention in 2014 and the recent expansion of 
51 See,	e.g.,	UNGA	‘Declaration	on	Permanent	Sovereignty	over	Natural	Resources’	UN	
Doc	A/RES/1803(XVII)	(14	December	1962).	Relevant	treaties	incorporating	the	










International Court of Justice confirmed the customary nature of the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources in its judgment of 19 December 2005 in 
the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo	case.	See	Armed Activities on the Territory 
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International	Importance’,	while	Article	3	prescribes	that	‘Contracting	Parties	shall	
formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the conservation of the 



















Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental Law in the Protection of 
Shared	International	Freshwater	Resources’	(2006)	46	Natural	Resources	Journal	157,	
160 fn 2.
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the UNECE Convention, customary norms as well as regional agree‐
ments still form the backbone of international freshwater law. This 
is	partially	because	relatively	few	States	have	thus	far	ratified	the	
conventions, but also because the UN Watercourses Convention 
itself encourages the conclusion of regional agreements. 
Nevertheless, considering the body of international freshwater law 
as a whole, it may be argued that it contains principles and rules that 
are crucial for the interpretation and implementation of arrange‐
ments	 with	 respect	 to	 water	 management	 in	 intra‐State	 peace	
agreements. Examples are discussed in the following section.
4.2 | A closer look at forms of interplay between 
natural resource arrangements and the international 
legal framework
Natural resource arrangements in peace agreements operate within 
the regulatory framework that was set out in the previous section. 
The international legal framework therefore directly impacts upon 
the	 implementation	of	 these	 arrangements.	More	 specifically,	 it	 is	
posited that international law provides a normative framework for 
the design and implementation of natural resource arrangements 
within the peace agreement. This relates to the first type of interplay 
between international law and peace agreements, as examined in 
Section	 2.	 In	 addition,	 it	 is	 posited	 that	 natural	 resource	 arrange‐
ments in peace agreements can also shape and further develop in‐
ternational law, most notably by giving substance to open‐ended 
norms and principles in international law. The current section exam‐
ines these forms of interplay in more detail, focusing specifically on 
water arrangements. It analyses the arrangements on the level of the 
agreement itself, without entering into details on how the arrange‐
ments have actually been implemented. The reason for this restric‐
tion	 stems	 from	 the	 article’s	 objective	 to	 conceptualize	 peace	
agreements and their interplay with international law rather than 
looking at how specific peace agreements are implemented. The cur‐
rent	 section	 is	 based	 on	 a	 study	 of	 approximately	 40	 intra‐State	
peace agreements.62
Intra‐State	peace	agreements	often	approach	water	from	a	devel‐
opmental or humanitarian perspective. These water arrangements 
focus on satisfying primary needs in the post‐conflict environment, no‐
tably restoring water installations and access to potable drinking water 
for	 the	 population.	 Examples	 include	 the	 2007	 agreement	 for	 Côte	
d’Ivoire,	which	contains	a	provision	on	the	rehabilitation	of	public	ser‐
vices, including with respect to water;63 the 2013 agreement on Darfur, 
which	provides	that	the	government	of	Sudan	‘shall	…	promote	general	
welfare and economic growth in Darfur through the provision of basic 
services	and	infrastructure	including	water’;64 and the 2015 agreement 
for	Mali,	which	contains	as	a	priority	 issue	the	rehabilitation	of	wells	
and sinks.65 International law is directly relevant for the implementa‐
tion of these provisions, as it sets standards for the right to access to 
water.	As	a	minimum,	identical	Article	1(2)	of	the	ICCPR	and	the	ICESCR	
on the right of peoples to economic determination determines that ‘in 
no	case	may	a	people	be	deprived	of	its	own	means	of	subsistence’.	In	
addition, pursuant to Articles 11 (adequate standard of living) and 12 
(right	to	health)	of	the	ICESCR,	everyone	is	entitled	to	‘sufficient,	safe,	
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and 
domestic	uses’.66	This	implies,	for	example,	that	a	State	recovering	from	
armed conflict should make careful choices on the arrangements to be 
made in implementing these provisions. The right to affordable water 
can	be	seriously	impeded	if	a	State,	for	example,	fails	to	make	adequate	
contractual arrangements with private water providers.
Furthermore, international human rights law stipulates that ac‐
cess to water should be provided on a non‐discriminatory basis. This 
can	be	derived	first	of	all	from	Article	2(2)	of	the	ICESCR,	which	stip‐
ulates	an	obligation	for	the	State	parties	‘to	guarantee	that	the	rights	
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without dis‐
crimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, po‐
litical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other	 status’.67	 The	 Committee	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	
Rights	has	further	emphasized	that	‘[w]ater	and	water	facilities	and	
services must be accessible to all, including the most vulnerable or 
marginalized	sections	of	the	population,	in	law	and	in	fact,	without	
discrimination	on	any	of	the	prohibited	grounds’.68 These and other 
standards derived from international human rights law should guide 
States	in	the	rehabilitation	of	water	services.69
Peace agreements also approach water more generally from a 
sustainable development or environmental perspective. The 2015 
Peace	Agreement	for	South	Sudan,	for	example,	stipulates	that	the	
transitional government ‘shall develop a comprehensive policy for 
the	use	and	management	of	South	Sudan’s	water	bodies,	 including	
but	not	limited	to	river	Nile’.70 Customary international law provides 
the principal framework for the implementation of this provision.71 
Particularly relevant for this example is the customary principle of 
equitable	utilization,	which	aims	 to	balance	 the	different	needs	of	
62 Most	of	these	agreements	have	been	included	in	the	Language	of	Peace	database.	This	
database has been developed by Cambridge University and United Nations Peacemaker; 
see <https ://www.langu ageof peace.org>. It enables key word searches of all peace 























analysis is confined to customary international law.
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the	riparian	States.	The	relevance	of	this	principle	for	the	manage‐
ment of shared watercourses has been confirmed by the International 
Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 its	 judgment	 concerning	 the	 Gabčíkovo–
Nagymaros	project	between	Hungary	and	Slovakia.	In	this	judgment,	
the	Court	recognized	a	 ‘basic	 right	 to	an	equitable	and	reasonable	
sharing	of	the	resources	of	an	international	watercourse’	for	all	ripar‐
ian	 States	 sharing	 a	 watercourse.72 The UN Watercourses 
Convention,	although	strictly	speaking	not	binding	on	South	Sudan	
or	the	other	States	sharing	the	Nile,	provides	a	relevant	framework	
for interpreting the principle of equitable use. In addition to defining 
the principle in Article 5, the Convention also formulates several fac‐




ulation	 dependent	 on	 the	watercourse	 in	 each	watercourse	 State	
and the effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one water‐
course	State	on	other	watercourse	States.	Articles	5	and	6	together	
may therefore provide an interpretative framework for the imple‐
mentation of the provision in the peace agreement.
Another example of a peace agreement that approaches water 
from a sustainable development perspective is the 2015 Peace 
agreement	for	Mali.	This	agreement	contains	a	provision	on	mea‐
sures that are to be taken on the longer term to promote develop‐
ment of the northern provinces, including measures to prevent the 
siltation of the river Niger.73	The	2008	Niger	Basin	Water	Charter	
and	its	Appendix	on	Environmental	Protection	of	the	Niger	Basin74 
include detailed provisions on the prevention of pollution, based 
on several important international environmental law principles, 
including the principles of precaution, prevention, public participa‐
tion and the polluter pays. The 2014 Revised Convention on 
Establishment	of	the	Niger	Basin	Authority	furthermore	provides	
an institutional framework for cooperation between the member 
States	of	this	international	organization	for	the	purpose	of	ensur‐
ing	‘an	integrated	development	of	the	Niger	Basin’.75 These agree‐
ments are all interconnected and provide the principal legal 
framework for any measures to prevent the siltation of the Niger, 
as	set	out	in	the	2015	peace	agreement.	This	means	that	Mali	must	
implement the relevant provision within the parameters provided 
by this regional framework and relevant principles of customary 
international law.
International water law therefore provides a normative, institu‐
tional and interpretative framework for the implementation of the 
commitments set out in both agreements. One could even argue that 
the commitments set out in the peace agreements restate existing 
obligations under international law. In this sense, international law 
could be considered the primary framework of reference for the in‐
terpretation and implementation of these provisions.
In addition to instances where water arrangements in peace 
agreements are shaped by international law, these arrangements can 
also shape and further develop international law. A word of caution 
is	appropriate	 in	this	respect.	The	 legal	status	of	 intra‐State	peace	
agreements is unclear and it cannot be assumed that these agree‐
ments	are	part	of	 international	 law,	as	set	out	 in	Section	2.	Peace	
agreements should therefore be approached primarily as instances 
of	State	practice,	one	of	the	constitutive	elements	of	the	process	of	
customary international law formation. To assess whether natural 
resource arrangements have developed the international legal re‐
gime for the governance of natural resources in post‐conflict set‐
tings, it must therefore be determined that these arrangements have 
merged into a consistent practice and that this practice reflects the 
opinio juris	of	these	States.76	Such	an	assessment	exceeds	the	limits	
of this article, which therefore confines itself to some preliminary 
observations.
The 2013 agreement between the government of the DR Congo 
and	 armed	 opposition	 group	M23	 as	well	 as	 the	 2016	 agreement	
between Colombia and the FARC provide relevant examples of prac‐
tice	which	has	the	potential	to	develop	international	law.	Both	agree‐
ments contain provisions on the cantonment of former members of 
the armed groups, as part of transitional security arrangements. 
Interestingly,	 the	 choice	 for	 the	 location	 and	 size	 of	 the	 camps	 is	
made conditional on the availability of water. The peace agreement 
between	 the	DR	Congo	and	M23	states	 in	 the	 relevant	part:	 ‘The	
criteria	for	the	selection	of	the	Primary	Cantonment	Sites	shall	 in‐
clude	the	following:	…	iv.	Availability	of	water.’77 Likewise, the peace 
agreement	between	Colombia	and	the	FARC	states	that	‘[t]he	size	of	
the	[transitional	local	points	for	normalization]	will	reflect	the	nature	
of the terrain, the amount of water and the number of FARC‐EP mem‐
bers	to	be	located	there’.78
These provisions build on the general provisions in the 1949 
Geneva	Conventions	and	the	1977	Additional	Protocol	II	on	humane	
treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in non‐international 
armed	conflicts.	Most	relevant,	Article	5(1)(b)	of	Additional	Protocol	
II determines that ‘the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to 







ction_%20env ironn ement_eng.pdf> (Appendix on Environmental Protection of the Niger 
Basin).
75 Revised	Convention	on	Establishment	of	the	Niger	Basin	Authority	(adopted	13	August	
2014) <http://www.abn.ne/image s/docum ents/Conve ntion/ revis ed_conve ntion.pdf> art 
3.
76 See	generally	on	the	process	of	international	customary	law	formation,	the	reports	of	
the International Law Commission on the Identification of Customary International Law, 
available through <http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/ 1_13.shtml >.
77 See	Outcome	Documents	from	the	Conclusion	of	the	Kampala	Dialogue	between	the	
Government	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	and	the	M23	(adopted	12	
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the same extent as the local civilian population, be provided with 
food	and	drinking	water’.79 This provision therefore formulates an 
obligation for a party to an armed conflict to provide drinking water 
to persons deprived of their liberty in relation to the armed conflict, 
but qualifies the contents of the obligation on the local circum‐
stances.80 This is a notable difference with the provisions included in 
the	two	peace	agreements,	which	precondition	the	location	and	size	
of the camps on the availability of water in the region. As such, these 
arrangements expand the protection of detainees in non‐interna‐
tional armed conflicts.
Furthermore, the 2016 peace agreement between the govern‐
ment	of	Colombia	and	the	FARC	explicitly	recognizes	that	protec‐
tion and promotion of access to water is an integral part of 
sustainable	 development.	 This	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	 agreement’s	
definition of sustainable development, as one of the principles that 
will guide the implementation of the package for comprehensive 
rural	reform	in	Colombia.	Sustainable	development	is	defined	here	
as ‘development that is environmentally and socially sustainable, 
requiring protection and promotion of access to water, as part of an 
ordered	concept	of	 territory’.81 The agreement furthermore con‐
tains an explicit reference to the right to water. Article 1.1.10 on 
‘closure	of	the	agricultural	frontier	and	protection	of	reserve	areas’	
determines that the government, pursuant to ‘the principles of 
rural	 community	 participation	 and	 sustainable	 development’,	will	
‘implement	an	environmental	zoning	plan	to	define	the	agricultural	
frontier … with a view to safeguarding biodiversity and the popula‐




rights (such as the rights to life, enshrined into Article 6 of the 
ICCPR, and to an adequate standard of living, included in Article 11 
of	the	ICESCR),	but	its	status	as	an	autonomous	human	right	is	still	
debated.83 The explicit reference to the right to water in the agree‐
ment	may	be	taken	as	evidence	of	State	support	for	the	existence	
of the right.
These are only some examples in which water arrangements 
in peace agreements provisions have the potential to shape the 
international legal regime on water governance. Of course, the 
conclusions that have been reached are tentative and require fur‐
ther study. Nevertheless, the examples clearly show that peace 
settlement practice may play a role in reinterpreting, expanding 
and confirming international legal norms related to the manage‐
ment of water in post‐conflict settings. In these ways, the ex‐
amples underline the relevance of peace settlement practice for 
international law.
5  | CONCLUSIONS
This article sought to assess how natural resource provisions in 
peace agreements are embedded in the international legal frame‐
work.	While	 it	 is	most	appropriate	 to	approach	 intra‐State	peace	
agreements	as	belonging	primarily	to	the	domestic	order	of	States,	
it is clear that these agreements interact in several ways with the 
international	 legal	 order.	 Similar	 conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 for	
natural resource management. While the management of natu‐
ral	resources	 is	entrenched	in	State	sovereignty,	States	have	also	
increasingly accepted international obligations that qualify their 
rights	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 their	 natural	 resources.	 States	 must	
therefore take into account these obligations when designing and 
implementing natural resource arrangements in peace agreements. 
In addition, international legal frameworks increasingly provide 
opportunities	for	cooperation	and	assistance	to	States	 in	the	 im‐
plementation of their commitments under peace agreements. In 
these ways, international legal norms and institutions shape natu‐
ral resource management as part of peace processes. Conversely, 
peace agreements aim to address specific challenges, such as the 
reintegration of former combatants, restoring livelihoods and 
remedying past wrongs. These challenges require tailor‐made so‐
lutions, which have the potential to bring important innovations 
to the international legal framework for the governance of natu‐
ral resources. In this way, peace settlement practice also shapes 
international law. This article assessed relevant examples of this 
interplay with respect to water governance. It showed the rele‐
vance of international human rights law, international freshwater 
law and international environmental law in a broader sense for the 
implementation of the agreements. It furthermore revealed how 
peace agreements can reinterpret, confirm and build upon relevant 
norms of international law.
This article constitutes only a first attempt to clarify the pro‐
cesses of interplay between natural resource arrangements in 
peace agreements and the international legal order. The conclusions 
reached are tentative and a more in‐depth study needs to be con‐
ducted	to	fully	understand	these	processes.	However,	 it	 is	evident	
that their implications for the implementation of natural resource 
arrangements and the international legal framework for the gover‐
nance of natural resources are potentially significant.
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